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Abstract
How does being an electoral winner or loser shape a citizen’s satisfaction with democracy?
More importantly, how does the voter’s institutional context moderate this relationship?
In this paper, I demonstrate that the institutional context of a democracy interacts with
a citizen’s national- level electoral loser status to moderate the relationship between the
individual’s status as a loser and her satisfaction with democracy in her country. I also
explore the way winning and losing at different levels of representation interact to formulate
satisfaction with democracy. Using cross-sectional survey data from the Comparative Study
of Electoral Systems nested in 75 different country-election year cases over the time period of
1996 to 2012, I find mixed evidence that electoral losers are more likely to be satisfied with
democracy when their chosen party is more favored by the party vote/seat share discrepancy.
Unlike losing voters, winning voters do not appear to be more or less likely to be satisfied
based on the vote/seat discrepancy. I also find mixed support for the idea that winning at
the national level produces greater satisfaction than winning at the district level.

iii

1

Introduction

In what ways do a democracy’s electoral institutions affect attitudes about the democratic
process among the winning and losing voters of an election? Additionally, do winning and
losing at different levels of representation also have an effect? Democratic systems of representation and their implications for voter behavior have long been an important topic of
study in the field of comparative political science research, among others (Fishburn and
Gehrlein, 1977; Powell, 1986, 1989; Nadeau and Blais, 1993). More broadly, we know that a
nation’s political institutions “matter” as they are the key design component for the formation of a democracy (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Weaver and Rockman, 1993;
Sartori, 1997; Taagepera, 2002). Part of the reason institutions matter is that they structure
the way representatives are elected by the mass public. Indeed, Arend Lijphart (2012) posits
that the two concerns at the heart of democracy pertain to who will do the governing and
whose interest will be responded to in the case of disparate preferences among the people.
However, there are a wide variety of electoral contexts present across the world through
which countries have answered these questions. A substantial body of previous research
suggests that proportional systems of representation tend to be positively associated with
aggregate citizen satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country (Anderson and
Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Klingemann, 1999; Powell, 2000; Karp and Banducci, 2008).1
However, there is a lack of work studying the variations in the propensity toward satisfaction
with democracy among the citizens both within and across PR systems.
While there have been a number of studies on the topic of institutions and satisfaction
with democracy, most of this empirical work has been concentrated on electoral system characteristics and whether the voter is an electoral winner or loser. This has left a lacuna in
the literature in terms of citizen satisfaction with democracy predicated on the real electoral
outcome vis-à-vis how voters are allocated representation in government via their preferred
1

Some recent work indicates possible limitations upon the extent to which electoral contexts contribute
to citizens’ assessments of the democratic process (e.g. Donovan and Karp, 2016)
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party.2 Investigating this gap is helpful as it has the potential to reveal substantive unexplored variations in citizens’ likelihood of satisfaction with democracy as it operates in their
country. Taking a more nuanced approach than the extant literature, I argue that not all
losing voters are the same. In this paper, I demonstrate that losing voters who are allocated
a greater share of seats than votes are more likely to be satisfied than those losing voters who
are allocated an equal or lesser share of seats than votes. I also demonstrate that a gap in the
likelihood of satisfaction is present for citizens who lose at different levels of representation
(district- and national-level), which sets them apart from citizens who win representation in
at least one level, as well as those who win representation at both.
This study is motivated by research that suggests that dissatisfaction with democracy
among a citizenry can undermine the legitimacy, as well as the stability of that democracy
(Lipset, 1959; Easton, 1965; Powell, 1982, 1986; Anderson and Mendes, 2006). And while
much of the extant literature theorizes the importance of citizen satisfaction for system legitimacy and stability, it has done little to empirically established a causal link between
these things. There is evidence to suggest that, in addition to the character of the transition
process from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one, institutional structures are vital
to the democratic consolidation in transitional states (Evans and Whitefield, 1995). Evans
and Whitefield also emphasize the important role played by citizens’ experience with democratic system norms and processes. These authors argue that, in transitional democracies,
the key elements that comprise public support for the new democratic system are the performance of new political institutions and the ability of electors to be heard via the party
and electoral system. Satisfaction with the democratic system is just as important in established democracies: satisfied citizens will be less likely to participate in pushes for radical
2

A notable exception to this is an article by Blais, Morin-Chassé and Singh (2015). However, this study’s
scope is limited to Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. It also controls for vote and seat shares
rather than using the actual differential for the party for which each voter cast his or her vote. Additionally,
it does not account for any possible interactive relationship between differential and winner/loser status. It
should also be noted that Howell and Justwan (2013) have studied satisfaction based on real-world electoral
outcomes. In this case, however, the authors focused on satisfaction as predicated on the winner’s margin
of victory.
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political change (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012). Furthermore, extant scholarship has linked
power-sharing democratic institutions with greater satisfaction with democracy, while also
evidencing a causal relationship between greater levels of satisfaction and greater levels of
political engagement (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Additionally, they will be more
likely to participate in the democratic process at the ballot box(Grönlund and Setälä, 2007).
Given that citizen participation is the bedrock of democracy, understanding the way electoral institutions and democratic performance formulate satisfaction, which in turn, affects
participation, is key for structuring a democratic government.
In this paper, I make the theoretical argument that while winners and losers have a
satisfaction gap between them, not all losers are alike, nor are all winners. The institutional
rules present in a country dictate the way in which votes are translated into seats. This
calculation determines the proportionality of party vote and seat shares, and, in turn, it
determines the level of benefit or detriment experienced by a party in terms of the discrepancy
between those shares. Parties that receive a smaller share of seats than votes are the victims
of this discrepancy. More importantly, voters are the real victims as they are less represented
than their vote share indicates they should be. Thus, I make the case that voters, particularly
those that lost, will have a higher likelihood of being satisfied with the way democracy works
if they are the beneficiary of party vote/seat share discrepancy.3 This approach is a novel one
in that it provides a more nuanced understanding of the way electoral structures, particularly
disproportionality, contribute to the way citizens feel toward their country in terms of its
version of democracy. Indeed, it allows us to see how likely it is that people are satisfied
based upon the interplay of voter returns and a crucial electoral rule that translates the will
of those people in the form of those votes into a representative body which will then act on
their behalf. Such specificity has largely been lacking in previous studies.4
3

A beneficiary of party vote/seat share discrepancy is a voter whose chosen party received a more
favorable proportion of seats to votes. Alternatively, a victim of vote/seat share discrepancy is a voter whose
chosen party received a less favorable proportion of seats to votes.
4

As mentioned above, Blais, Morin-Chassé and Singh (2015) and Howell and Justwan (2013) are exceptions to this, as they are more nuanced than much of the extant literature.
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I also make the argument citizens’ partisan congruence across different levels of representation matters. That is to say that there is a difference in satisfaction for citizens based
on the different levels of representation in which citizens can win or lose. The structure
of many political systems attributes representation to people based on their particular geographic region (or district), and the resulting representation then forms the makeup of their
national-level government. Citizens who lose at both the district level and the national level
will be unrepresented or underrepresented when compared to their counterparts who won
representation in at least one level. Winning at both levels should produce the greatest
likelihood of satisfaction, as citizens who win at both levels will have representation that is
congruent with their partisan preferences in both cases. This parsing of the likelihood of
satisfaction based on representation at different levels is a novel approach, in that it compares and contrasts the consequences of national elections at the district level with those
outcomes at the national level. One can win a battle, but lose the war, i.e. win a great
deal of representation at the district level, but still have one’s party outnumbered in the
legislature as a consequence of the national elections as a whole.
In order to gain leverage over these questions, I test my theoretical arguments through the
use of repeated cross-sectional survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
(CSES) Modules 1-4 which surveys citizens in countries all over the world, as well as an array
of country- and district-level institutional and electoral data. I find that electoral losers
are more likely to be satisfied with democracy when losers are relatively more advantaged
from party vote/seat discrepancy (meaning their party of choice received a more favorable
proportion of seats to votes). However, if the vote/seat discrepancy disadvantages losers
(meaning the party of their choice received a less favorable proportion of seats to votes),
their likelihood of satisfaction is lower. I also find that winning and losing at different
levels of representation matters for a citizen’s satisfaction with democracy, as those who lack
representation at both the district and the national level are less likely to be satisfied than
those citizens who have representation at one level or more. Lastly, I find that there is no

4

clear pattern of satisfaction in the Central and Eastern European countries over time, nor is
there a pattern of satisfaction for even some of the most longstanding democracies.
This work provides evidence which indicates the presence of a satisfaction differential
based on the inequitable reality of electoral rules. Such a differential may contribute to the
erosion of democratic system legitimacy and stability through the tendency of dissatisfied
individuals toward radical political activism. In the following section of the paper, I discuss
in greater detail the theory that undergirds the hypothesized relationship between citizens’
status as a winner or loser, their benefit (or detriment) at the hands of disproportionality,
and their satisfaction with the way democracy operates in their country. I also discuss the
theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesized relationships between winning and losing at
different levels of representation and satisfaction, as well as those of the relationship between
the temporal component and winning and losing in consensus and majoritarian systems.
Next, I describe the cross-sectional CSES data upon which I draw in order to conduct my
analyses, including the coding of all variables incorporated in my various statistical models.
From there, I discuss my methodology and the robustness checks which were undertaken to
help provide a greater degree of confidence in the results of my analyses. Lastly, I will offer
concluding remarks regarding my results and their implications for our understanding of the
determinants of satisfaction with democracy, as well as offer avenues for future research.

5

2

Theoretical Development

A wealth of scholarly work has studied the way in which electoral outcomes contribute to
certain attitudes toward democracy as held by the citizenry.5 However, the concept of public
support for, or satisfaction with, democracy is somewhat ambiguous. In order to study this
phenomenon, a distinction must be made between the different elements of which it is comprised. In his seminal work, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Easton (1965) distinguishes
between support for a specific set of elected leaders that happen to occupy political office
at a given time (specific support) and support for the political system, i.e. the democratic
system (diffuse support). These types of support are related and underlie the concept of political support, with the former being based on evaluations that reflect judgments about the
current political landscape and the later being based on affective orientations that represent
deep-seat adherence to a set of values (Dalton, 1999).6 More recent literature has expanded
upon the distinction made in this foundational work (Muller and Jukam, 1977; Dalton, 1999;
Norris, 1999; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; Kotzian, 2011). An additional differentiation to
be made is that of support for democratic principles (Weil, 1989; Linde and Ekman, 2003).
Therefore, in studying public support for democracy, one must take care to specify the type
of support to be studied, whether it be support for the current government, support for the
democratic system, or support for the very principles of democracy themselves. While all of
these elements have important roles to play in what they can tell scholars, this manuscript
is primarily concerned with how specific support —voting for the current government— interacts with institutional structures to formulate diffuse support — citizens’ level of support
for the democratic system in their country.
5

For but a few examples, see Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978); Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson (1995);
Anderson and Guillory (1997); Norris (1999); Anderson and Tverdova (2001); Bowler and Donovan (2002)
and Anderson et al. (2005).
6

This relationship is evidence in the work of scholars such as Citrin and Green (1986); Gabriel (1989);
Nadeau and Blais (1993); Anderson and Guillory (1997); Bowler and Donovan (2002); Anderson et al. (2005);
Singh, Lago and Blais (2011); and Singh (2014).
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In order to have a functioning democracy, a state, at minimum, must have free, fair, and
competitive elections in which citizens are allowed to cast their vote for one of at least two
political rivals (Dahl, 1956; Norris, 2014). Blais and coauthors (2015, p.1) note that typically,
when people cast a vote in an election, they are casting that vote for a party, “which receives
few or many votes and seats, and which does or does not enter government.”7 However,
according to Anderson and Guillory (1997, p. 68), “the same set of democratic institutions
can have different consequences for different groups among those governed by them, and in
particular for those in the political minority and majority.” It is within this context that I
examine satisfaction with democracy.
Speaking more broadly, previous scholarship has indicated that elections are associated with an increase in satisfaction with democracy among the members of the citizenry
(Ginsberg and Weissberg, 1978; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Adam, 2014). Parties are the
vehicle through which voters gain their elected representation. Voting in elections — a
form of specific support —directly or indirectly determines the winning and the losing parties/candidates while also creating ambivalence toward winners on the part of the losers
(Kaase and Newton, 1995; Nadeau and Blais, 1993). Winners are those citizens who voted
for the governing party (or a party that is a member of the governing coalition). The literature also suggests that casting a vote for the party that wins government is associated with
a more pronounced increase in satisfaction (Citrin and Green, 1986; Gabriel, 1989; Nadeau
and Blais, 1993; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Bowler and Donovan, 2002; Anderson et al.,
2005; Singh, Lago and Blais, 2011; Singh, 2014). Indeed, being an electoral winner in even
a single instance will increase satisfaction with democracy (Curini, Jou and Memoli, 2012).8
These voters are inclined towards satisfaction with democracy as they likely perceive the
7

These authors also note that in candidate-centered elections, such as those in SMD systems, open list
systems, and mixed member systems, people may cast a personal vote for an individual candidate (Blais
et al., 2003; Marsh, 2007). However, an overwhelming majority of citizens cast their vote based on partisan
association.
8

It should be noted that Curini, Jou and Memoli (2012) found satisfaction with democracy only continues
to increase due to repeated winning after the initial win if the winner is in close ideological proximity to the
government.
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government to be sensitive to their desires (Citrin and Green, 1986; Kuechler, 1986; Lambert et al., 1986; Gabriel, 1989; Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Kornberg and Clarke, 1994). Losers
are those who voted for a minority party (or a party that is not a member of the governing
coalition). Thus, they are inclined towards dissatisfaction with democracy as they, in turn,
likely perceive the government to be dismissive of their desires.
And, indeed, it is reasonable for both of these groups of voters to perceive things in the
way that they do, as evidenced by the literature. In keeping with Pitkin’s (1967) delegate
model that I have just alluded to, there is a wide literature that suggests that not only
are elites responsive to public preferences, but more specifically, they are responsive to
the majority.9 Anderson and Guillory’s (1997) findings suggest losers are more satisfied in
consensual systems because they are more likely to have their preferred policies achieved than
losers in majoritarian systems. Thus, parties are a vehicle to arrive at elected representation
which will then be particularly sensitive to the desires of the winners.
In order to further our understanding of the way in which winning (or losing) relates
to satisfaction with democracy, some scholars have demonstrated changes in satisfaction
among winning and losing voters by utilizing panel studies which record satisfaction levels
both before and after the election (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Blais,
Morin-Chassé and Singh, 2015).10 Such work allows for the identification of the change in
satisfaction as it relates to an election. There is also a growing literature that examines the
way in which characteristics and performance by the party one has chosen to support can
influence satisfaction. Indeed, there is evidence that winning creates enhanced satisfaction
among those who are ideologically proximate to the government that forms after the election
(Curini, Jou and Memoli, 2012). Singh and coauthors (2012) have also found evidence that
voting for the party that wins government is associated with a greater degree of satisfaction
9

See the following for related discussion: Downs (1957); Weissberg (1978); Page and Shapiro (1983);
Ferejohn (1986); Page and Shapiro (1992); Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995); Wlezien (1995); Geer
(1996); Wlezien (1996); Cohen (1997); Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008).
10

Additionally, see Anderson and LoTempio (2002) for a panel study dealing with political trust predicated
on being an electoral winner.

8

than is found among those who voted for a party that just enters the legislature.

11

These

arguments lead me to the following hypothesis.12

H1 : Voters that win at the national level should have a higher level of satisfaction
with democracy while voters that lose should have a lower level of satisfaction.
Lijphart’s index of majoritanianism/consensualism, as utilized by Anderson and Guillory
(1997) to demonstrate the relationship between consensus democracy and satisfaction, has
a number of dimensions which are based upon the structure and powers of each branch of
government in the democracy, as well as the structure and makeup of the electoral system.
The dimension I am primarily concerned with here is that of (dis)proportionality. Lijphart
(1984, p. 161) himself notes that “except under the most unusual circumstances, it is impossible for any electoral system to yield exactly proportional results.” Disproportionality
is a dimension which has a specific quality of theoretical interest which the other dimensions offered by Lijphart lack. I would argue that disproportionality has more bearing on
satisfaction with democracy than the other dimensions due to its proximity to the voter.
Indeed, the mathematical approach to distributing a share of seats based on the vote shares
allotted to parties by the voters is more directly connected to those voters in theoretical
terms than whether for instance the legislature is unicameral or the constitution allows for
judicial review. This is not to say that the other dimensions have no bearing on voters’
satisfaction with the way democracy works, but rather that I find disproportionality the
most theoretically compelling dimension as it actually translates the will of the people into
their elected representation.
11

Additionally, some scholarly work has indicated that a tight margin of electoral victory leads to a
heightened level of satisfaction among winning voters (Howell and Justwan, 2013). There is also evidence
that satisfaction is enhanced when a voter is strongly linked on a psychological level with the winning party
(Singh, 2014).
12

While support for similar hypotheses has already been found by previous scholarship, this hypothesis
is key to the theoretical developments I offer in this paper as it underlies the logic for the novel hypotheses I
offer. Additionally, I argue that it is helpful to reexamine this relationship in the broader contexts that are
associated with a newer dataset with greater cross-national coverage than the datasets previously utilized in
testing this and related hypotheses.

9

I argue that in both majoritarian and consensual systems, not all winners in a given
country are created equal, nor are all losers. My theoretical expectation is that satisfaction
with democracy among voters will be moderated by the voters’ status as losers (or winners)
and the discrepancy in representation they experience due to the level of disproportionality
in the translation of their chosen party’s vote-share into its seat-share. More specifically, if a
losing voter casts a vote for a party that is more advantaged by vote/seat share discrepancy,
I posit that her likelihood of satisfaction will be greater than that of a losing voter that was
less advantaged by vote/seat share discrepancy. This is due to the fact that the losing voter
whose party is more advantaged receives a greater degree of representation than her losing
counterpart whose party is less advantaged. Additionally, both those losers that are more
advantaged and those that are less advantaged will have a lower likelihood of satisfaction
when compared to winning voters. I also posit that winning voters who are more advantaged
by vote/seat share discrepancy will have a higher likelihood of satisfaction than those winners
who were less advantaged by it. This argument rests on an assumption that voters are able to
receive information about electoral outcomes from sources such as the media and discern the
relative fairness of that election from that information. Voters capable of basic arithmetic
can assess whether they were “cheated” out of seats by the rules of the game, or whether
they “made out like bandits” by taking more of their fair share.
Furthermore, the argument assumes that voters are sensitive to any discrepancy in the
translation of votes into seats. The intuitions here are drawn from the study of distributive and procedural fairness in a variety of fields, such as politics, economics, sociology, and
psychology. Extant work on distributive and procedural fairness supports the notion that
people tend to have a sensitivity to procedural fairness, along moral and strategic dimensions (Rasinski and Tyler, 1988; Anand, 2001; Cremer and Blader, 2006). Furthermore, the
procedural justice literature suggests that perceived fairness in procedure is associated with
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greater satisfaction in outcomes (den Bos, Wilke and Lind, 1998).13 Given the propensity of
people to be attuned to distributive and procedural fairness, I argue that voters will be sensitive to rules of the game and the translation of votes into seats. My hypotheses regarding
the mediating effect of vote/seat disproportionality and winner/loser status on satisfaction
can be found below along with Table 1 which indicates my theoretical expectations.
H2 : Voters that lose at the national level and are more advantaged by vote/seat
share discrepancy should display a higher level of satisfaction with democracy
than those losing voters that are less advantaged by such discrepancy.
H3 : Voters that win at the national level and are more advantaged by vote/seat
share discrepancy should display a higher level of satisfaction with democracy
than those winning voters that are less advantaged by such discrepancy.
Table 1. H1, H2, H3: Hypothesized Likelihood of Satisfaction with Democracy based on Vote/Seat
Discrepancy

Loser
Winner

Harmful Discrepancy
Lowest Likelihood of Satisfaction
High Likelihood of Satisfaction

Beneficial Discrepancy
Low Likelihood of Satisfaction
Highest Likelihood of Satisfaction

Heretofore unexamined, there lies the relationship — or lack thereof — between what
it means to win and lose at different levels of representation. While the literature cited
above strongly suggests that being a winner via congruent partisan control of the national
government or via congruent partisan participation in the governing coalition increases one’s
likelihood of being satisfied, scholars currently have very little insight into how district-level
dynamics in representation that might have interplay with those national-level dynamics.
We know that being an electoral winner in even a single instance will increase satisfaction
with democracy (Curini, Jou and Memoli, 2012), but what about the effect on satisfaction
13

While satisfaction with outcomes seems more directly related to specific support — as an electoral
outcome — it is still suggestive of an overall sense of attention to fairness in rules and procedures, which I
argue, in turn, can interact with specific support to formulate diffuse support.
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when an individual votes for a party that carries their district or gets a majority or plurality
of the representation to be had there while their party fails to control government either
alone or in coalition with other parties? This under-explored electoral outcome based on
winning and losing across levels of representation may have substantial explanatory power
over satisfaction with democracy.
While not directly comparable, Anderson and LoTempio (2002) hypothesize that “voters
who vote for winners more often should exhibit higher levels of trust than those who vote
for winners less often. Conversely, voters who vote for losers more often should display
lower levels of trust than those who vote for losers less often” (338). These authors make
the case that these two patterns, when taken together, indicate that citizens should have
“more positive attitudes about the political system if they voted for the winners than if
they voted for the losers. However, when those who voted for the losers in one electoral
arena also voted for the winners in another, they should [have more positive attitudes] than
when they voted only for losers. Similarly, when citizens vote for the winners in more than
one electoral contest, they should [have more positive attitudes] than when they voted for
the winners in only one” (338). Given the close association of ideas like that of trust in
government, efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy in the literature, I draw on Anderson
and LoTempio’s work here to develop my own intuitions about winning across levels of
representation. My hypothesis about the differential effect of winning and losing across
levels of representation, as well as Table 2 detailing my theoretical expectations, appear
below.
H4 : Voters that win at both the national level and the district level should have a
higher level of satisfaction with democracy than those voters that only won at one
level or the other, while those that lost across both levels should have the lowest
level of satisfaction.

12

Table 2. H4: Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy based on Winning and Losing at Different Levels
of Representation

District
Loser
District
Winner

National Loser
Lowest Level of Satisfaction

National Winner
Intermediate Level of Satisfaction

Intermediate Level of Satisfaction

Highest Level of Satisfaction

In the next section of the paper, I discuss the data I employ, as well as my measurement
and coding strategy for empirically analyzing the above stated hypotheses.

13

3

Data and Measurement

The theoretical arguments I make herein pertain to individual-level analysis. I utilize data
from the CSES Modules 1-4 which contain post-election polling data that correspond with
elections from 1996 through 2013 as well as Gallagher’s index of electoral system disproportionality (Gallagher, 2015). The individual-level surveys from the aforementioned CSES
modules will provide data about individuals’ satisfaction with democracy in their nation.
It also provides system level data about national level party vote shares for lower house
elections as well as the resulting allocation of seats. Additionally, It provides district level
vote share data. Data regarding control of governments is drawn from the Parliaments and
Governments Database (Döring and Manow, 2015), as well as the Political Data Yearbook
(ECPR, 2016).
My case selection for this analysis is based on the following criteria: given my theory
makes inferences about the level of satisfaction found among voters who either did or did not
vote for a party that came to control government I look only at parliamentary systems and
semi-presidential systems — specifically in years where there is no government cohabitation.
This is due to the possibility of divided government that is present in presidential and semipresidential systems where cohabitation occurs, which can lead to a break down in terms of
what it means to be a winner or a loser. Thus, the scope of the research is confined to the
74 country-election year cases with the necessary data in the CSES Modules 1-4.14
14

These modules and all pertinent documents for the purpose of analysis can be found at this web address:
http://www.cses.org. The country-year cases included in the analysis for this study are as follows: Albania
(2005), Australia (1996, 2004, 2007, 2011), Austria (2008), Belgium (1999, 2003), Canada (1997, 2004, 2008),
Croatia (2007), Czech Republic (1996, 2002, 2006, 2010), Denmark (1998, 2007), Estonia (2011), Finland
(2003, 2011), France (2007), Germany (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013), Greece (2009, 2012), Hungary (1998,
2002) Iceland (1999, 2003, 2007, 2009), Ireland (2002, 2007), Israel (1996, 2003, 2006), Italy (2006), Japan
(1996), Latvia (2010), Montenegro (2012), Netherlands (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010), New Zealand (1996, 2002,
2008, 2011), Norway (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009), Poland (2005, 2011), Romania (1996, 2004), Serbia (2012),
Slovakia (2010), Slovenia (1996, 2008), South Africa (2009), Spain (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008), Sweden (1998,
2002, 2006) and the United Kingdom (1997, 2005). This list is exhaustive, as it includes every countryyear for which the relevant survey data related to a parliamentary election was available, given the criteria
outlined in the main text.
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3.1

Outcome Variable

My dependent variable across all my analyses — satisfaction with democracy, or satisfaction
— is measured based on the individual survey responses to the question about level of satisfaction with democracy in the four modules of the CSES from 1996-2013.15 Much scholarly
analysis has employed a measure of how satisfied people are with the way democracy works
in their country based on responses to survey questions (e.g. Weil, 1989; Kuechler, 1991;
Clarke and Kornberg, 1992; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Fuchs, 1999; Karp, Banducci and
Bowler, 2003; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Howell and Justwan, 2013). Indeed, these questions
are intended to measure respondents’ assessments of how democracy actually functions, as
opposed to their attitudes toward a particular individual or party in the current government
(Lockerbie, 1993). However, this measure is imperfect and has been found to correlate with
other measures of support (e.g. partisan preference or executive approval).16 On the other
hand, such imperfection does not discredit its use. Anderson (2002, p. 10) argues that the
measure is a ”reasonable (albeit imperfect indicator that we can use to test our theories.” He
also makes the case that the findings of Canache, Mondak and Seligson (2001) give evidence
to the notion that this indicator actually does measure some dimension of the desired concept, so long as one begins with the assumption that satisfaction with democracy actually
measures something.17 Based on the theoretical questions raised in this paper, this indicator
15

As discussed above, numerous studies have used satisfaction with democracy as an outcome variable
(Harmel and Robertson, 1986; Kuechler, 1986, 1991; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 1993; Lockerbie, 1993;
Kornberg and Clarke, 1994; Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, 1995; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Anderson
and Tverdova, 2001; Farrell and McAllister, 2006; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Curini, Jou and Memoli, 2012;
Campbell, 2013; Howell and Justwan, 2013).
16

See Canache, Mondak and Seligson (2001); Klingemann (1999); Kornberg and Clarke (1994) for further
discussion of the relationship between specific and diffuse support.
17

Canache, Mondak and Seligson (2001) are the only scholars thus far to produce results that could be
argued to wholly invalidate satisfaction with democracy as a measure of the concept of support for the way
democracy functions. However, as Blais and Gélineau (2007) note, based on the work of Anderson (2002),
Canache and coauthor’s conclusions are based on the analysis of data from newer democracies where one
would expect the linkage between specific support and satisfaction with democracy to be stronger than the
linkage between diffuse support and satisfaction with democracy.
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appears to most closely approximate how citizens feel about the way the democratic system
in their country actually operates (Anderson, 1998; Linde and Ekman, 2003).18
For my purposes, survey respondents are coded categorically as either not at all satisfied,
not very satisfied, fairly satisfied, or very satisfied as opposed to the more commonly used
dichotomous measure with respondents being either ’satisfied’ or ’dissatisfied.’ This approach
largely breaks with the extant literature. Indeed, Howell and Justwan argue that “the base
satisfaction threshold of satisfied or not is analytically more interesting than the internal
variations between ‘fairly’ and ‘very’ satisfied or between ‘not very’ and ‘not at all’ satisfied”
(2013, p. 339). I disagree, and offer as part of the novel contribution of this research the
idea that nuances in satisfaction should be examined, just as nuances in institutional rules
should be. The import of differences in levels of satisfaction becomes more readily apparent
when oneAs has been discussed previously, this measure, while imperfect, appears to capture
satisfaction about democratic functioning in the respondent’s country, which is the concept
at issue here. The aggregated distribution of this variable across countries is depicted in
Figure 1 below. Note roughly twenty percent of Greek respondents are satisfied with the
way democracy operates there in contrast with the more than ninety percent of Danish
respondents who are satisfied with the way democracy operates in that country. On the
whole, consensual systems such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain and Sweden have a vast majority of respondents in each that are more satisfied than
less, while countries like Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Latvia, and Slovenia, have quite a bit
less than a majority who identify as being satisfied. This research helps to clarify the
determinants of the intensity of satisfaction, rather than just whether citizens are satisfied
or not.
18

Further discussion on improving measures of diffuse support can be found in the concluding section of
this paper.
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Figure 1. Satisfaction with Democracy, by country

3.2

Explanatory Variables

Below I discuss the explanatory variables for the three sets of analyses I conduct based upon
the sets of hypotheses outlined above.

Winning, Losing, and Vote/Seat Discrepancy: H1, H2, H3
My main independent variable — national electoral winner/loser status, or loser — is coded
as a dichotomous variable. The CSES data sets contain questions that ask how the respondent voted in the most recent elections. It also contains data on which parties controlled
government after the election. The respondent will be coded 1, as an electoral loser, if his or
17

her survey response indicates that his or her votes does not coincide with a party that gained
an executive ministerial post (which indicates that a party is not part of the government).
The respondent will be coded 0, as an electoral winner, if his or her survey response indicates
that his or her vote coincides with a party that received at least one executive ministerial
post after the election as this is indicative of an electoral win (based on the party having a
presence in the government) at national level. This operationalization of winner/loser status
based on presence in government is in keeping with the literature.19
My next main independent variable — party vote/seat discrepancy, or discrepancy —
will be coded as a continuous interval-level variable measuring the disproportionality between
lower house vote and seat shares. This measure is attained by subtracting the vote share of
the party for which the respondent cast his or her vote by the seat share they are allocated
after the election.20 Based on my data, the scale ranges from -12.78 to 20.38. Negative
values indicate that a party was negatively impacted by disproportionality, gaining a smaller
share of seats than their share of votes. Positive values indicate that a party was positively
impacted by disproportionality, receiving a greater share of seats than their vote share. A
value of zero means that the party was allocated a percentage of seats equal to the percentage
of the vote that party received. I expect a positive relationship between disproportionality
and satisfaction among both winning and losing voters. The following equation is used to
derive vote/seat discrepancy:

Di = Si − Vi

(1)

where D is the discrepancy, S is seat share, V is vote share, and i is a given party.
19

See Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Blais and Gélineau (2007) as examples of this kind of approach.

20

Blais, Morin-Chassé and Singh (2015) use a different measure of vote-seat disproportionality while
studying satisfaction with democracy which they refer to as the deficits in representation. However, their
approach has issues with collinearity that this measurement does not. It also does not directly capture the
benefit or detriment of disproportionality to the voter.
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To put a finer point on my discussion of this variable, I will employ the following empirical
example. Norway is considered to be a moderately consensual political system (Lijphart,
1984, 1999). Table 3 below depicts the vote shares and seat shares of each party that
contested Norway’s 2005 legislative election. It also denotes the discrepancy between each
party’s seat share and its vote share, as well as which parties went on to form the government.
In this particular election voters who cast their votes for AP, FRP, and SP were winning
voters, as those are the parties that formed government. However, each of these parties was
affected differently by vote/seat discrepancy.
Based on this difference, I argue that voters who voted for a winning party such as the
AP which received a +3.40% benefit from vote/seat discrepancy will have a higher likelihood
of being satisfied with democracy than say a voter who voted for another winning party, such
as the SV, which received only a +0.05% benefit. Additionally, I would expect voters who
voted for both of these winning parties to have a greater likelihood of satisfaction than voters
who voted for a hypothetical winning party that was disadvantaged by vote/seat discrepancy
(meaning it has a negative value for discrepancy). The percentage of party members in these
parties who are satisfied appears consistent with these expectations. I also argue that voters
who voted for a losing party such as the Venstre which received a +0.68% benefit from
vote/seat discrepancy will have a higher likelihood of being satisfied with democracy than
say a voter who voted for another losing party, such as the RV, which received a -1.23%
vote/seat share discrepancy disadvantage. Not all winners are the same, nor are all losers.
This leads me to the discussion of my next variable.
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32.69
22.06
14.10
8.83
6.78
6.48
5.24
1.23

Fremskrittspartiet (FRP)

Høyre (H)

Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)

Kristelig Folkeparti (KRF)

Senterpartiet (SP)

Venstre (V)

Rød Valgallianse (RV)

Vote Percentage

Det Norske Arbeiderparti (AP)

Party
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0.00

5.92

6.51

6.51

8.88

13.61

22.49

36.09

Seat Percentage

-1.23

+0.68

+0.03

-0.27

+0.05

-0.49

+0.43

+3.40

Discrepancy

Table 3. Norwegian Legislative Election Results for 2005

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

In Govt?

78.95

88.78

93.02

88.76

92.49

90.37

77.35

94.36

Percent Satisfied

I utilize an independent variable which is an interaction term, which consists of loser
and discrepancy. This interaction term measures the way in which vote/seat discrepancy
moderates the likelihood of satisfaction among electoral losers. This is because beneficial
vote/seat discrepancy can offset the negative consequences of being an electoral loser on an
individual’s propensity to be satisfied with their country’s democratic system. My expectations are that winners and losers are more likely to be satisfied when they benefit from
vote/seat discrepancy as this would mean they have a greater degree of representation and
control than what is reflected in their vote share. More specifically, I expect losers benefiting
from vote/seat discrepancy to have a higher likelihood of satisfaction than losers who benefited less or were disadvantaged by such a discrepancy. Additionally, winners who benefit
should have a higher likelihood of satisfaction than those winners who benefited less or were
disadvantaged.

Winning and Losing at Different Levels of Representation: H4
My next key independent variable for this analysis — district electoral winner/loser status,
or district loser — is coded as a dichotomous variable. The CSES data sets contain questions
that ask how the respondent voted in the most recent elections. It also contains data on
each competing party’s district-level vote share. The respondent will be coded 1, as a district
electoral loser, if his or her survey response indicates that his or her vote does not coincide
with a party that gained a majority or plurality of votes in that district (which indicates
that their party did not carry the district). The respondent will be coded 0, as a district
electoral winner, if his or her survey response indicates that his or her vote coincides with a
party that received a majority or plurality of votes as this is indicative of an electoral win
(based on the party having carried the district) at district level. While this is certainly not
a perfect measure, I am limited to the available data in order to operationalize this concept.
I also utilize a third key independent variable for testing H4 — joint winner/loser status,
or joint loser — which is coded as a categorical variable. This variable categorizes each
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individual as (a) having lost at both levels of government, (b) having won at the district
level but lost at the national, (c) having lost in their district but won at the national, or (d)
having won at both levels of representation. Respondents were coded to these categories by
examining their values for each national loser and district loser.21
In addition to these, I employ a logged control variable for district magnitude — Logged
DM — which is coded as an interval level variable ranging from 0 to 6.91. This variable is
based on the raw district magnitude for the district in which each respondent resides and
is logged to account for the diminishing returns of adding additional district seats at higher
magnitudes. Given the theory undergirding this particular analysis is one which pertains to
district-level political outcomes, controlling for logged magnitude seems appropriate, as it
will help account for the effect of the variance in magnitude on satisfaction.22

Controls for All Models
I employ a control for age of democracy drawn from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers
and Gurr, 2014). This variable is coded as a continuous measure based on the number of years
the regime has existed. I include this variable given the extant literature’s acknowledgement
of the role experience with democracy plays with regard to determining satisfaction (Evans
and Whitefield, 1995). Based on this literature, my expectations are that as the number of
years for which a country has been a democracy increases, so too will the likelihood that
citizens in that democracy will identify as being satisfied.23
In testing these hypotheses, I also plan to account for the demographic characteristics
of voters in order to discern any patterns of satisfaction across sociodemographic attributes.
21

As is shown below, this measure is useful in terms of graphically depicting the hypothesized relationship.
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I will also make use of the variables Gallagher and discrepancy in certain models for this analysis. These
models can be found in the appendix.
23

I do not interact this variable with losing status and discrepancy, as some might expect. I argue that
even in newer democracies, voters are capable of seeing election results and coming to conclusions, just based
upon the mathematics, about how the discrepancy between vote shares and seat shares can either hurt or
benefit them.
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I will control for these sociodemographic characteristics based on the answers of survey
respondents found in modules 1-4 of the CSES dataset. The sociodemographic variables I
include are Female (coded 1 if the respondent is female, 0 if male), Age (coded numerically
based on the respondent’s actual age), Education (coded from 1 to 5 with 1 being a very
low level of education, such as no formal education or only early childhood or incomplete
primary, and 5 being a very high level of education, such as a university degree or more),
and Employment status (1 if employed, 0 if otherwise). Significant findings in this regard
may be indicative of which socioeconomic cleavages are being prioritized by elites in these
democratic regimes.24
I do not control for sociotropic and egocentric economic performance evaluations like
Anderson and Guillory (1997), among others, have done in their research. The primary
reason for this is that the CSES questionnaire does not include any questions about how the
respondent perceives the economy or her own financial future. Additionally, I do not control
for household income due to the paucity of individual-level data in the available survey
modules. However, I do employ a control for logged gross domestic product per capita,
to account for economic performance and its potential to drive respondents’ evaluations of
democratic performance. Data for this variable is drawn from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators dataset for all country-years in my analysis. Descriptive statistics
for all of the variables utilized in my analysis can be found in the appendix in Table A3, while
Tables A4, A5, A6 in the appendix provide greater detail regarding all variable codings.
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See Chhibber and Torcal (1997) and Zielinski (2002).
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4

Analysis

4.1

Analysis of Satisfaction Predicated on Winning, Losing, and
Vote/Seat Discrepancy: H1, H2, H3

In the literature developed to this point, scholars have yet to delve into how discrepancies
between vote and seat shares can affect satisfaction with democracy. In beginning to address
this gap, I have arrived at evidence which supports the notion that discrepancies between a
party’s vote and seat shares do impact the likelihood that voters who support that party will
be satisfied with the way democracy works. Due to the hierarchical structure of my data,
which has individuals nested in countries, I estimate a multilevel ordinal logit model which
allows inclusion of micro- and macro-level control variables as well as cross-level interactions
in an effort to demonstrate the robustness of my findings.25
The first step to this analysis is to make the determination as to whether patterns of
individual satisfaction with democracy established by the extant literature are evidenced by
these data. Hypothesis 1 asserts voters that win at the national level should have a higher
likelihood of satisfaction with democracy than those voters that lose. I find support for
this hypothesis, with losers having 0.11 decreased probability of satisfaction compared with
winners, holding all else at means.26 Having established support for the notion that national
level electoral winners have a greater likelihood of satisfaction with democracy than losers,
I must next account for my variable of interest in H2 and H3 : level of discrepancy. Table 4
below presents a multilevel ordinal logistic regression examining the likelihood of satisfaction
with democracy among winners and losers predicated on levels of vote share/seat share
discrepancy that these individuals — and their preferred parties —experience. In order to
more easily examine the substantive impact of vote/seat share discrepancy on the likelihood
25

See Steenbergen and Jones (2002).
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This relationship is negative and statistically significant at the α = 0.001 level. Logit coefficients and
changes in predicted probability are reported in Tables A1 and ?? in the appendix, as this hypothesis testing
is not directly related to the novel theoretical and empirical contribution of this manuscript.
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of satisfaction, I plot the change in predicted probability among winners and losers across
a range of discrepancy values. The changes in predicted probability for both winners and
losers are plotted in Figure 2 below.
My second hypothesis posits voters that lose at the national level while being more
advantaged by vote/seat share discrepancy should have a higher level of satisfaction with
democracy than those losing voters that are less advantaged by such discrepancy. My third
hypothesis posits voters that win at the national level while being more advantaged by
vote/seat share discrepancy should have a higher likelihood of satisfaction with democracy
than those winning voters that are less advantaged by such discrepancy. Across all four outcome categories in Figure 2, I find that the not only are winners and losers indistinguishable
from one another, but their lines are largely flat, indicating that the likelihood respondents
identify as being satisfied at that given level is not affected by changes in vote/seat discrepancy. Thus, while my interaction coefficient is significant, I find little evidence of meaningful
substantive interactive effect. This suggests voters are not sensitive to changes in vote/seat
share discrepancy as I have hypothesized.
The average marginal effect of being a loser is shown in Figure 3 below. This figure
suggests that becoming a loser in associated with a party that is most negatively impacted
(disadvantaged) by discrepancy is associated with a nearly a -0.05 change in a citizen’s
probability of being very satisfied, where as were that loser associated with a party that
is most positively impacted (advantaged) by discrepancy, they would have no discernible
change in their probability of satisfaction. There is a similar effect on the probability a
citizen will be Fairly Satisfied. Becoming the most disadvantaged loser is also associated
with a 0.05 increase in the likelihood the citizen will identify as not very satisfied. It is
also associated with a 0.1 increase in the probability of being Not At All Satisfied. In
both instances, as discrepancy approaches the upper observed value, the average marginal
effect becomes indistinguishable from zero. This figure lends some support to the idea that
vote/seat discrepancy does indeed shape losers’ satisfaction.
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Table 4. Multilevel Ordinal Logit Regression Coefficients - Satisfaction with Democracy: H1, H2, H3

Independent Variable

Model 1
Coeff.

S.E.

Fixed effects
Loser
Discrepancy
Loser × Discrepancy
Logged GDP Per Capita
Regime Age
Female
Age
Education
Employed

-0.495***
0.005
0.024***
-0.711***
-0.008***
-0.109***
-0.001**
0.064***
0.053***

(0.018)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.063)
(0.002)
(0.014)
(0.001)
(0.006)
(0.016)

-10.142***
-8.106***
-5.018***

(0.656)
(0.656)
(0.656)

1.974

(0.506)

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Random Terms
Intercept Variance
χ2
Log Likelihood
N individuals
N countries

1774.61
–86102.392
83864
33

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with std. errors in parentheses. *** = p ≤ 0.001, ** = p ≤ 0.01, and
* = p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test.
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Figure 2. Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Satisfaction
Note: Shaded areas indicate 95% Confidence Intervals.

Figure 3. Average Marginal Effect of Losing on Satisfaction
Note: Whiskers indicate 95% Confidence Intervals.
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4.2

Winning and Losing at Different Levels of Representation: H4

The extant literature has mostly ignored district-level electoral outcomes thus far, meaning
that we have no real basis for understanding how these outcomes can affect satisfaction
with democracy. To fill this void, I have arrived at evidence which supports the notion
that winning and losing at different levels of representation do impact the likelihood that
voters will be satisfied with the way democracy works. Table 5 presents Model 3 below.
This a multilevel ordinal logistic regression examining the likelihood of satisfaction with
democracy among winners and losers at both national and district level.27 In order to more
easily interpret the substantive effect of the interaction of national winner/loser status and
district winner/loser status on the likelihood of levels of satisfaction, I plot the change in
predicted probability among winners and losers based on their national and district status.
The changes in predicted probability for both winners and losers are plotted in Figure 4
below.
My fourth hypothesis posits voters that win at both the national level and the district
level should have a higher level of satisfaction with democracy than those voters that only
won at one level or the other, while those that lost across both levels should have the lowest
level of satisfaction. In Figure 4, I find that across all combinations of winning and losing,
voters are most likely to be Fairly Satisfied. They are also more likely to be Not Very
Satisfied than they are Very or Not At All, which are indistinguishable from one another.
More importantly for my hypothesis is that the effect of each winning and losing combination
on each outcome is indistinguishable from the others. That is, the probability of indicating
any given level of while one is both a national and district loser is indistinguishable from the
probability of indicating that same level when one is both a national and district winner, as
well as the combinations in between.28
27

I also estimate a model which interacts the Joint Loser variable with Vote/Seat Discrepancy. This
model can be found in the appendix in Table A2.
28
The confidence interval for being a national loser and a district winner is 0.345 to 0.477, while it is 0.527
to 0.612 for being a national winner and a district loser. This indicates that the coefficients for these two

28

Figure 4. Predictive Margins of Satisfaction
Note: Whiskers indicate 95% Confidence Intervals.

categories are distinguishable from one another. The confidence interval for being a winner at both levels is
indistinguishable with being a national winner and a district loser, as it ranges from 0.587 to 0.689. Losing
at both levels is the excluded category.
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Table 5. Multilevel Ordinal Logit Regression Coefficients - Satisfaction with Democracy: H4

Model 2
Independent Variable
Fixed effects
National Loser
District Loser
National Loser × District Loser
Joint Loser
National Loser, District Winner
National Winner, District Loser
National Winner, District Winner
Logged DM
Logged GDP Per Capita
Discrepancy
Regime Age
Female
Age
Education
Employed
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3

Coeff.

S.E.

Coeff.

S.E.

-0.227***
-0.069**
-0.343***

(0.038)
(0.026)
(0.042)

–
–
–

–
–
–

–
–
–
-0.055
-0.483***
-0.001
-0.007**
-0.125***
-0.002**
0.082***
0.051**
-8.175***
-6.141***
-3.042***

–
–
–
(0.034)
(0.128)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.017)
(0.001)
(0.008)
(0.019)
(1.297)
(1.297)
(1.296)

0.412***
0.570***
0.638***
-0.055
-0.483***
-0.001
-0.007**
-0.125***
-0.002**
0.082***
0.051**
-7.537
-5.502
-2.403

(0.034)
(0.022)
(0.026)
(0.032)
(0.128)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.017)
(0.001)
(0.008)
(0.019)
(1.297)
(1.297)
(1.297)

1.293
0.041

(0.405)
(0.010)

1.293
0.041

(0.405)
(0.009)

Random Terms
Country Intercept Variance
District Intercept Variance
χ2
Log Likelihood
N individuals
N districts
N countries

Model 3

1349.25
–59498.301
58436
167
27

1109.54
–59498.301
58436
167
27

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with std. errors in parentheses. In Model 3, the excluded category for
Joint Loser is National Loser, District Loser. *** = p ≤ 0.001, ** = p ≤ 0.01, and * = p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed
test.
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5

Conclusion

At the outset of this paper, I offered the following question for consideration: In what ways
do a democracy’s electoral institutions affect attitudes about the democratic process among
the winning and losing voters of an election? How is this relationship conditioned by factors
such as winning and losing at different levels of representation? There are many ways to
approach these question, both in terms of the institutions one examines and in terms of what
it means to be a winner or loser. In this paper, however, I have opted to examine the way
in which rules regarding the translation of national-level vote share into seat share affect the
satisfaction citizens have with the way democracy operates in their country. I also define
winning as having voted for a party that forms government and losing as having voted for a
party that did not.
My reasons for examining this institutional structure at this level, as it relates to satisfaction, are based on the fact that national-level vote shares are one of the key elements
that determine which party (or parties) will control government. I am interested in the
relationship between vote share and seat share, as it reflects the way in which the will of the
mass public in a democracy is translated into actual representation. One might argue, and
intuitively so, that winning voters will have a higher likelihood of being satisfied with the
way democracy works in their country, while losers will have a lesser likelihood of satisfaction. Additionally, one might also intuitively argue that voters whose party does not receive
a share of seats that is at least equal to the party’s vote share might have a lesser likelihood
of satisfaction with the way democracy operates as they have suffered from the discrepancy.
Whereas, if a voter’s party receives more seats than their vote share would dictate, they
would show a greater likelihood of satisfaction, as they have benefited from the discrepancy.
I have also examined the way in which winning and losing at different levels of representation can affect satisfaction. This research takes the first stab at discerning what winning
and losing look like across different levels of representation in that it begins to account for
district-level electoral outcomes such as the relative vote share of a citizen’s preferred politi31

cal party. This work is useful in that it has the potential to help demonstrate that a diffusion
of representation across levels can allow for increases in a citizen’s likelihood of satisfaction
with democracy via representation that is “closer” to them than the national level, which is
more typically studied in the context of large-N cross-national scholarship.
While I have provided further support for the finding in the literature that winning voters
will have a higher probability of satisfaction than losers (as evidenced by my results testing
H1 ), my analyses also finds mixed support for my hypothesis that losers’ level of satisfaction
with democracy is higher when they have greater benefit from vote/seat discrepancy. This
is a novel finding which allows us to have a deeper understanding of how specific electoral
mechanics can influence citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy functions. However
I find that winner’s likelihood of satisfaction is largely unaffected by vote/seat discrepancy.
That is to say its influence is not statistically distinguishable from zero. This is a less
intuitive finding. However, it is possible that winning is what really matters to winners.
Indeed, my finding suggest it might be less important to winning voters what their share of
seats is relative to their share of votes. Rather, the important thing is that their party is in
government. Further research should be conducted so as to parse out why winners are not
influenced by vote/seat discrepancy.
I have also found mixed support for the notion that district-level representation matters
for citizens (as evidenced by the results of my analyses which test H4. I find that winning
at the national level distinguishes a citizen’s likelihood of satisfaction from a citizen who
did won only at the district level or not at all. However, those that won at both levels
are indistinguishable from those that won at only the national. Further research should be
conducted which can begin to account for how else winning at the district level might look
different from winning at the national level as it pertains to satisfaction. Accounting for
the actual proportion of district seats gained in determining winners and losers would be
helpful and allow for more conceptually rigorous variable construction, and, thus, more valid
testing.
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Thus far, most cross-national work on the determinants of citizen satisfaction with democracy have largely focused on established democracies. Future scholarship should aim to discover when and how new democracies begin to look like long-established ones in terms of
their citizens propensity or level of satisfaction. Questions of interest would be (1) at what
temporal and structural point does the winner/loser satisfaction gap emerge in new democracies, (2) does a majoritarian/consensus gap in satisfaction emerge in new democracies as
it has in old, (3) does the relative distribution of power across national and district levels
moderate the effect of winning and losing at those different levels on satisfaction, and (4) is
the satisfaction of citizens living in new democracies with an authoritarian legacy sensitive
to electoral rules which translate the will of the people into their representation. The contributions herein lay some of the theoretical and empirical ground work for exploring these
other important substantive questions. Gaining theoretical and empirical leverage over such
questions will allow the scholarly community to further situate nascent and new democracies
relative to their long-standing counterparts, possibly determining how democratization and
democratic structures emerging in the modern day contrast with those that democratized
their institutions decades, or even hundreds of years ago.
More pressing is the matter of measurement. Further consideration should be given to
whether the survey items employed in this literature for measuring satisfaction with democracy as a system actually tap into peoples attitudes about the operations of democracy as a
system, and not some performance evaluation of the sitting government. While it may make
pooled comparisons across time difficult, scholars should look for ways to improve survey
items geared toward measuring such attitudes, as it will allow for more accurate inferences.
A possible way forward would be cross-national cognitive interviewing, which entails surveying a small number of respondents who are then encouraged to ‘think aloud’ while answering
survey items. Beyond this, interviewers can prompt and probe the respondent so as to better understand what kind of considerations the respondent takes when answering questions
regarding their satisfaction with the way democracy operates in their country. This might
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help alleviate some concerns over translation problems, as well as inform scholars as to how
the items themselves are internalized by respondents. Crafting a measure that offers greater
validity will be a costly challenge, but it has the potential to enhance the ability of scholars
to discern the effects of electoral institutions and outcomes on citizens’ satisfaction.
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Blais, André, Alexandre Morin-Chassé and Shane P. Singh. 2015. “Election Outcomes,
Legislative Representation, and Satisfaction with Democracy.” Party Politics .
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Appendix
Table A1. Binary Logit Regression Coefficients - Satisfaction with Democracy: H1

H1 Model
Coeff.

S.E.

-0.602***

(0.017)

Regime Age

0.013***

(0.003)

Female

-0.056***

(0.016)

-0.001*

(0.001)

Education

0.097***

(0.008)

Employed

0.078***

(0.018)

0.034

(0.171)

0.743

(0.123)

Independent Variable
Fixed effects
Loser

Age

Const
Random Terms
Intercept Variance
χ2
Log Likelihood
N individuals
N country-years

1494.47
–45932.058
83921
75

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with std. errors in parentheses. *** = p ≤ 0.001, ** = p ≤ 0.01, and
* = p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test.
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Table A2. Multilevel Ordinal Logit Regression Coefficients - Satisfaction with Democracy: H4 with Discrepancy interaction
Model 3
Independent Variable
Joint Loser
National Loser, District Winner
National Winner, District Loser
National Winner, District Winner
Discrepancy
Joint Loser × Discrepancy
National Loser, District Winner
National Winner, District Loser
National Winner, District Winner
Logged DM
Logged GDP Per Capita
Regime Age
Female
Age
Education
Employed
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Random Terms
Country Intercept Variance
District Intercept Variance
χ2
Log Likelihood
N individuals
N districts
N countries

Coeff.

S.E.

0.401***
0.553***
0.684***
0.006

(0.035)
(0.025)
(0.030)
(0.005)

-0.004
-0.001
-0.019*
-0.056
-0.516***
-0.007**
-0.125***
-0.002**
0.083***
0.051**
-7.878***
-5.843***
-2.744***

(0.010)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.032)
(0.129)
(0.002)
(0.017)
(0.001)
(0.008)
(0.019)
(1.312)
(1.312)
(1.312)

1.344
0.041

(0.421)
(0.010)

1361.16
–59492.112
58436
167
27

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with std. errors in parentheses. In Model 3, the excluded category for
Joint Loser is National Loser, District Loser. *** = p ≤ 0.001, ** = p ≤ 0.01, and * = p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed
test.

43

Descriptive statistics and coding details for the variables utilized in this study can also
be found in the tables below.
Table A3. Descriptive Statistics

Variables

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Satisfaction

83,864

2.74

0.75

1

4

Loser

83,864

0.48

0.50

0

1

National Loser

83,864

0.48

0.50

0

1

District Loser

58,436

0.70

0.46

0

1

Joint Loser

58,436

2.32

1.21

1

4

Vote/Seat Share Discrepancy

83,864

2.17

4.70

-12.78

20.38

Logged GDP Per Capita

83,864

10.35

0.41

8.92

11.12

Regime Age

83,864

60.37

39.55

0

134

Logged DM

83,743

1.97

2.03

0

6.91

Female

83,864

0.51

0.50

0

1

Age

83,864

48.15

16.70

17

106

Education

83,864

3.28

1.20

1

5

Employed

83,864

0.58

0.49

0

1

Here I provide additional models which also control for system-level disproportionality,
or Gallagher — which is coded as a continuous interval-level variable measuring system
disproportionality based on the widely used Gallagher index.29

30

The scale ranges from

0 to 100 with lower values indicating less disproportionality and higher values indicating
more disproportionality. Given that one of my key independent variables is a party-level
29
For just a few examples, see Lijphart and Aitkin (1994); Anderson et al. (2005); Blais and Bodet (2006);
Karp and Banducci (2008); Lijphart (2012); Davis (2014); Donovan and Karp (2016).
30

For the data itself, see Gallagher (1991, 2015).
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measure of vote/seat share disproportionality, or discrepancy, it is important to parse out
the effects of system-level disproportionality to ascertain the effects of a party’s vote/seat
share discrepancy on individual voters.31 It is derived from the following equation:
r
LSq =

1 n
Σ (Vi − Si )2
2 i=1

(2)

Where LSq is the disproportionality, V is the vote share, S is the seat share, and i is a given
party and n is the number of parties.

31
I will also note that this measure is not correlated with my key independent variable, vote-seat discrepancy.
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R’s status as an electoral loser

Loser

way

Discrepancy The difference between a R’s chosen
party’s seat share and its vote share

R’s Satisfaction with
Democracy operates

Satisfaction

the

Variable Description

Variable
Name

46

R’s party’s seat share minus vote
share. Positive values indicate that
R’s party was benefited by the discrepancy (meaning it received more
a greater percentage of seats than
votes), while negative values indicate that R’s party was disadvantaged (receive a lesser percentage
of seats than votes). Continuous,
ranging (theoretically) from 0 to
100.

1 = loser, meaning R voted for a
party that did not become part of
the government (the party received
no cabinet portfolios); 0 = winner,
meaning R voted for a party that
became part of the government (the
party got at least one cabinet portfolio).

1 = satisfied; 0 = dissatisfied

Variable Coding

Table A4. Variable Details

CSES Modules 1-4 (Vote Share
variables: A5005, B5001, C5001,
D5001; Seat Share variables: A5006,
B5002, C5002, D5002).

Macro-Level variables from CSES
Modules 2-4 (B5009, C5013, D5013)
and data from Parlgov and the Political Data Yearbook.

Survey instruments from CSES
Modules 1-4 (A3001, B3012, C3019,
D3017).

Variable Source

Variable Description

Gallagher’s Index of Party-Level
Disproportionality

R’s Gender

R’s Age in Years

R’s highest level of education

R’s Employment Status

Variable
Name

Gallagher

Female

Age

Education

Employed

47

1 = Employed; 0 = Unemployed

1 = Very Low (None, early
childhood, or incomplete primary);
2 = Low (primary,
lower
secondary/incomplete
secondary);
3
=
Moderate
(upper
secondary/completed
secondary); 4 = High (postsecondary
trade/vocational/nontertiary/short-cycle tertiary, incomplete bachelor); and 5 = Very High
(completed bachelor or higher)

R’s Age in Years

1 = Female; 0 = Male

Variable derived from
q the following
equation: LSq = 12 Σni=1 (Vi − Si )2

Variable Coding

Table A5. Variable Details (cont’d)

Survey Instruments from CSES
Modules 1-4 (A2007, B2010, C2010,
D2010).

Survey Instruments from CSES
Modules 1-4 (A2003, B2003, C2003,
D2003).

Survey Instruments from CSES
Modules 1-4 (A2001, B2001, C2001,
D2001).

Survey Instruments from CSES
Modules 1-4 (A2002, B2002, C2002,
D2002).

Gallagher (2015); Continuous, ranging (theoretically) from 0 to 100.

Variable Source

Variable Description

The Log of the magnitude each respondent’s district

R’s status as a national electoral
loser

R’s status as a district electoral loser

R’s status as a national and district
electoral loser

Variable
Name

Logged DM

National
Loser

District
Loser

Joint Loser

48

1 = National and District Loser; 2 =
National Loser, District Winner; 3
= National Winner, District Loser;
4 = National and District Winner

1 = loser, meaning R voted for a
party that did not get at least plurality of the district-level vote; 0 =
winner, meaning R voted for a party
that did receive at least a plurality
of the district-level vote.

1 = loser, meaning R voted for a
party that did not become part of
the government (the party received
no cabinet portfolios); 0 = winner,
meaning R voted for a party that
became part of the government (the
party got at least one cabinet portfolio).

Continuous, ranging from 0 to 6.9

Variable Coding

Table A6. Variable Details (cont’d)

Based off the codings of National
Loser and District Loser, which
in turn are based on survey instruments from CSES Modules 14 (A4004, B4004, C4004, D4004,
B5009, C5013, D5013) and data
from Parlgov and the Political Data
Yearbook.

District-Level variables from CSES
Modules 1-4 (A4004, B4004, C4004,
D4004).

Macro-Level variables from CSES
Modules 2-4 (B5009, C5013, D5013)
and data from Parlgov and the Political Data Yearbook.

CSES Modules 1-4 (A4001, B4001,
C4001, D4001).

Variable Source

Vita
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